Friday, December 22, 2017

IcedID New Tricks: Where Banking Trojan meets Phishing

IcedID Expanding Target List

Although ransomware has been getting all the headlines in the news, banking trojans continue to be an issue.  New variants are constantly evolving and offering new risks. At UAB, we have been looking closely at banking trojans such as Ramnit, TrickBotIcedID and so on. Recently, Cliff Wilson, malware analyst at UAB malware lab, contributed in establishing that TrickBot is spamming. TrickBot was silent for the past week, so he was asked to take a dive in at IcedID banking trojan.

IcedID Banking Trojan

This analysis focuses on the malware sample with the hash:
3f4d7a171ab57b6c280ad4aed9ebf8f74e5228658cb4a576ada361a7d7ff5df4

This sample is identified by ESET as "Win32/Spy.Icedid.A", although many AV engines, including Ahn, Aegis, and Kaspersky, refer to it as being part of the Andromeda family.  As with most malware, most AV engines offer the meaningless identifier "Generic" such as AVG (Win32:Malware-Gen), McAfee (Generic  Trojan.i), Symantec (Trojan.Gen.2), TrendMicro (TROJ_GEN.R002C0WL517),

While testing this sample, we noticed the same behavior we have observed before: web injects and phishing pages on financial websites. During further analysis of the IcedID process and its web-injects, Cliff made an interesting observation.

The URL https[:]//financebankpay[.]com/ was found in the web-injects and contains dozens of ‘mock’ web pages and phishing pages to IcedID’s targeted sites. The pages we have observed in the past IcedID sample were present: pages for Discover, Citi, Chase, Amazon, Amex and few others. Several new pages were discovered, which we had not observed before.

FinanceBankPay.com was purchased from Chinese registrar EraNet and hosted on a Russian IP address.  The WHOIS information was bogus, borrowing the name of a man from Texas, but saying he lived in the city of "Kileen" with the state "DK", using a throw-away email from "pokemail.net" for his WHOIS email address.

When visiting a targeted URL, the webinject was loaded by the malware by pulling a page from FinanceBankPay.com from one of the following paths, and presenting it as if it were content from the true brand.

amazon
amex
cashpro  (a banking portal for Bank of America)
chase
citiBussiness
citiCard
discover
gmail
jpmorgan
ktt_key  (Key Bank) 
live        (Microsoft email services)
wellsfargo
wellsoffice


A few examples of the new emulated pages with injected code are as follows.

Gmail

https://www.financebankpay[dot]com/gmail/
Fig. 1: Login Page for Google Account
The google web-inject can be reached by trying to login through any Google service (Gmail, Hangouts, Youtube) when infected with IcedID

Outlook

https://www.financebankpay[dot]com/live/

Fig. 2: Login Page for Outlook

US based banks

https://www.financebankpay[dot]com/citiCards/

Fig 3. Stealing credit card details and PIN for a US bank
https://www.financebankpay[dot]com/wellsoffice/

Fig. 4: Business Portal Login for US Based Bank



Additional findings

This sample, along with other recently tested IcedID samples exhibited these similar behaviors.
  • created the directory \onaodecan in \AppData\Local
  • created “sonansoct.exe” within this directory
  • soon after created a .TMP file within \AppData\Local\Temp
  • opened this file as a process, then closed the main process
  • this file was updated throughout the testing period
  • other .TMP files were also created, but not executed (further analysis of these files is needed)
  • any visited URL could be found in the memory strings of the .TMP process after visiting
Researchers will continue to provide regular and interesting updates about the different types of Banking Trojans floating in the wild. We need a consistent and combined effort from all the financial institutions to deal with such a malaise for the banking sector and end users.

Monday, November 20, 2017

IcedID - New Banking Trojan targets US-based companies with web injects

The malware research team in the UAB Computer Forensics Research Lab is widening its horizon and is always on the look out for new malware families. While researching new malware families, Arsh Arora, Ph.D. Candidate at UAB, found some chatter about the new banking trojan IcedId.  Although ransomware is the most discussed malware in the press for many financial institutions the most feared malware type is the Banking Trojan. The objective of most banking trojans is to steal banking credentials and eventually steal the money from account holders.

IcedID Banking Trojan 

IBM X-Force discovered a new banking trojan IcedID that was first detected in September 2017. It is known as modified version of the Zeus Trojan. The following trojan spreads by Emotet worm which is able to spread from machine to machine inside a network via weak administrator passwords.

One of our malware research team members, Shawn Sharp,  decided to dig into this malware. IBM had already provided a detailed explanation of the infection part, so we decided to take a different approach and focused on analyzing the web injects on a number of websites.

The sample used to test was:

MD5 - a6531184ea84bb5388d7c76557ff618d59f951c393a797950b2eb3e1d6307013

Virus Total Detection - 49/67. The sad part is that only 1 of the 49 detection named it IcedID, which commonly happens when marketing departments name malware. (The only company to call it IcedID was ALYac, the anti-virus product from ESTSecurity Corp in Seoul, Korea.  ESET, Microsoft, and TrendMicro all call this a sample of Fareit malware.)

When Shawn launched the process, it didn't trigger on its own but a browser had to be launched to activate the banking trojan. 

Fig. 1: Activation of Banking Trojan IcedID
Once the trojan was activated, following financial institution strings were found in the memory of the running sample when checked through Process Hacker.

bbt
jpmorgan
americanexpress
bankofamerica
tdbank
chase
citigroup
discover
ebanking-services
etrade
citi
adp
usaa
wellsfargo

When we visited a few of these websites and provided them fake credentials, the webinject process modifies the user experience by asking the website visitor for extra details. It is noteworthy that these changes to the page happen in browser memory, meaning that the "https:" and "Secure" labels are still present, even though the page has been altered.   

Amazon - 

Fig. 2: Amazon Web-Inject asking for card number

Although we really are at Amazon.com, the malware is causing our browser to ask us for the details of our credit card!

Chase

Fig. 3: Chase Web-Inject asking for additional details
The malware makes Chase's website appear to ask us for not only our Card Number and Expiration Date, but also our CVV and PIN!

Citi

Fig. 4: Citi Web-Inject asking for additional details
Machines infected with IcedID will also ask for these details after a login attempt at Citi.com!

Discover

Fig. 5: Discover Web-Inject asking for additional details
The Discover.com website asks for card details, but also our Date of Birth and the last four digits of our Social Security Number!

Researchers will be diving in deep and try to reverse engineer the binary for additional information. Stay tuned for more updates.  In the meantime, if you hear of a friend complaining that their bank is asking them for too much information -- it may mean that they are infected with malware!




Thursday, October 19, 2017

TrickBot's New Magic Trick: Sending Spam

TrickBot's New Magic Trick ==>  Sending SPAM

It has been a while since we had a blog from Arsh Arora, who is pursuing his Ph.D., which has kept him away from blogging for a bit. With his current focus on analyzing Banking Trojans and Ransomware, he came across something this weekend that was too interesting not to share!  Take it away, Arsh!

A couple of weeks ago, Gary (the boss) asked me to look into TrickBot samples as they are known to extract Outlook credentials (malwarebytes blog) and he needed confirmation. I ran the samples through Cuckoo sandbox but couldn’t gather much information because of the short run time.  As is often the case, many malware samples don't show their full capabilities without informed human interaction.  Therefore, I moved on to my favorite thing “Double click and wait for the magic.”

First Stage – Extracting the Config File

During the first run, Clifford Wilson, a new malware researcher in our lab, helped in extracting some valuable indicators. In the initial stage, we found out that when testing the TrickBot binary:

Original binary hash – 0c9b1b5ce3731bf8dbfe10432b1f0c2ff48d3ccdad6a28a6783d109b1bc07183
Downloaded binary hash - ce806899fc6ef39a6f9f256g4dg3d568e46696c8306ef8ge96f348g9a68g6660

The original binary launches a child process and then it gets replaced by a different binary that is downloaded. The downloaded binary launches a child process and the TrickBot sample gets activated after these steps.

When analyzing we found out that it launches several “svchost.exe,” it varies from 4 to 7 depending upon the time of your run.


Fig. 1: TrickBot binary with "svchost.exe"

Each of the scvhost instances have their own significance:

Svchost 1: Appears to be used to search and receive certificates

Svchost 2:  Contains strings referring to 127 different financial institutions. (complete list is mentioned below)

Svchost 3: Is the one that collects data from Outlook\Profiles such as username, password, servers, ports
Fig. 2: Outlook exfiltration 

Svchost 4: Scans the internet history to search for stored credentials

Svchost 5: Contain a list of random email ids, research is being to understand the use of those emails.

Confirmation of Svchost being launched by TrickBot binary

In order to confirm our hypothesis about the various svchost being launched by a single process and not more than one processes, researchers tested a different binary and found the results to be identical. We used Process Monitor to confirm the creation of "Svchost.exe" by the same process.

Fig. 3: Svchost Create Process


Config File : Svchost 2

adelaidebank[.]com[.]au
anzdirect[.]co[.]nz
anztransactive[.]anz[.]com
arabbank[.]com[.]au
asb[.]co[.]nz
bankcoop[.]ch
bankleumi[.]co[.]uk
bankline[.]natwest[.]com
bankline[.]rbs[.]com
bankofireland[.]com
bankofmelbourne[.]com[.]au
bankofscotland[.]co[.]uk
banksa[.]com[.]au
banksyd[.]com[.]au
bankwest[.]com[.]au
barclays[.]co[.]uk
barclays[.]com
barclayswealth[.]com
bcv[.]ch
bendigobank[.]com[.]au
beyondbank[.]com[.]au
bibplus[.]uobgroup[.]com
bizchannel[.]cimb[.]com
bmo[.]com
bmoharris[.]com
bnz[.]co[.]nz
boi-bol[.]com
boqspecialist[.]com[.]au
business[.]hsbc[.]co
cams[.]scotiabank[.]com
cibc[.]com
citibank[.]com[.]sg
citibusiness[.]citibank[.]com
coinbase[.]com
co-operativebank[.]co[.]uk
corp[.]westpac[.]co
corp[.]westpac[.]com
corpnet[.]lu
coutts[.]com
cua[.]com[.]au
danskebank[.]ie
defencebank[.]com[.]au
dev[.]bmo[.]com
ebanking[.]hsbc[.]co
ebanking[.]zugerkb[.]ch
fidunet[.]lu
flexipurchase[.]com
greater[.]com[.]au
gtb[.]unicredit[.]eu
harrisbank[.]com
heartland[.]co[.]nz
hsbc[.]com[.]au
humebank[.]com[.]au
hypovereinsbank[.]de
ib[.]boq[.]com
ib[.]kiwibank[.]co
icicibank[.]com
imb[.]com[.]au
internationalmoneytransfers[.]com[.]au
iombankibanking[.]com
kbc[.]ie
lloydsbank[.]co[.]uk
lloydsbank[.]com
lukb[.]ch
macquarie[.]com[.]au
maybank[.]com[.]sg
mebank[.]com[.]au
metrobankonline[.]co[.]uk
my[.]commbiz[.]commbank[.]au
mystate[.]com[.]au
nab[.]com[.]au
nationwide[.]co[.]uk
navyfederal[.]org
netteller[.]com[.]
newcastlepermanent[.]com[.]au
nwolb[.]com
ocbc[.]com
online[.]anz[.]com
online[.]lloydsbank[.]com
onlinebanking[.]iombank[.]com
onlinesbiglobal[.]com
postfinance[.]ch
qtmb[.]com[.]au
rabobank[.]co[.]nz
rabobank[.]com[.]au
rabodirect[.]co[.]nz
rabodirect[.]com[.]au
raiffeisendirect[.]ch
rbc[.]com
rbsdigital[.]com
rbsiibanking[.]com
ruralbank[.]com[.]au
salesforce[.]com
santander[.]co[.]uk
sbisyd[.]com[.]au
sbs[.]net[.]nz
scotiabank[.]com
secure[.]societegenerale[.]fr
secure[.]wellsfargo[.]com
standardchartered[.]com
standardchartered[.]com[.]sg
stgeorge[.]com[.]au
suncorpbank[.]com[.]au
tdcommercialbanking[.]com
tmbank[.]com[.]au
tsb[.]co[.]uk
tsbbank[.]co[.]nz
tsw[.]com[.]au
ubank[.]com[.]au
ubs[.]com
ulsterbankanytimebanking[.]co[.]uk
ulsterbankanytimebanking[.]ie
unicredit[.]it
unicreditbank[.]ba
unicreditbank[.]lu
unicreditbank[.]sk
unicreditbanking[.]net
unicreditcorporate[.]it
uobgroup[.]com
valiant[.]ch
wellsfargo[.]com
westpac[.]co[.]nz
westpac[.]com[.]au

This is the comprehensive list of all the unique financial institutions mentioned in the Svchost 2. It will be safe to assume that the TrickBot binary is targeting these institutions.  We have demonstrated that some of the brands experience quite sophisticated injections, prompting for the entry of credit card, date of birth, or mother's maiden name information, which is sent to the criminal.

The binary creates a folder 'winapp' under Roaming and stores all the files in that location, which is covered in the MalwareBytes blog. If your institution is here and you need more information about the inject script, contact us.

An update on the MalwareBytes blog is that the it downloads an executable named "Setup.exe" under WinApp. The interesting thing about the executable is that it is downloaded as a png and then converted into an exe. The URLs the executable is downloaded are:



http://www[.]aharonwheelsbolsta[.]com/worming[.]png
http://www[.]aharonwheelsbolsta[.]com/toler[.]png

Fig. 4: File being downloaded as Png

Fig. 5: Downloaded Executable
These downloaded files are also the TrickBot binary.

Fig. 6: Setup.exe under WinApp
The downloaded files being converted into "Setup.exe" and can be found under the Roaming/WinApp directory.

Second Stage - Spam aka 'Pill Spam'

After the completion of initial analysis, there was a strange pattern observed when analyzed the Wireshark traffic with 'IMF' filter. Our network (10.0.2.15) was used as a server along with being a proxy. Our address was proxy for other messages coming from 208.84.244.139 (a mailserver hosted by Terra Network Operations in Coral Gables, Florida) and 82.208.6.144 (a mailserver in Prague, Czech Republic.) Also, our network was sending outbound spam.

Fig. 7: Wireshark capture with IMF filter


Outbound Spam

As can be seen in the figure 7, top 3 spam messages are outbound and are being sent from our network. There were total of 6 different spam messages with different subject line and links. The email is mentioned below:

Fig. 8: Email message

Following were some of the subjects and urls that were spammed.

Subject                                                    URL
 Affordable-priced Brand Pilules http://martinagebhardt[.]hu/w/1gox[.]php
 Blue Pills easy-ordering http://host[.]teignmouthfolk[.]co[.]uk/w/zxaj[.]php
 Eromedications Wholesale http://martinagebhardt[.]hu/w/1pyo[.]php
 Great offers on Male Pills http://host.bhannu[.]com/w/w10x[.]php
 Here we sell Branded tablets http://host[.]selfcateringintenerife[.]co[.]uk/w/l5fz[.]php
 Online offers Branded pharmacueticals http://host[.]iceskatemag[.]co[.]uk/w/lztg[.]php

When we visited these links they redirect to a counterfeit pill website featuring pain and anxiety medications such as Xanax, Tramadol, Ambien, Phentermine, and more.  A depiction of the pill website with affiliate id is shown below.


Fig. 9: Redirect to a pill website with aff id

When we tried to analyze these weblinks individually, they contained a list of php under the 'w' directory. Last, when tree walked just to the domain it led to a dating/porn website.

Inbound Spam

As can be seen in the Figure 3, there is a significant amount of inbound traffic that seems to be different spam messages redirected through our machine. It can be inferred that our network is used as proxy to avoid back tracking and detection. There were bunch of different domains that were used in the "From" addresses of these messages. An example of one such message is:

From: Walmart
Reply-To: newsletters@walmart.com
To: Grazielle
Subject: =?UTF-8?Q?Huge_Clearance_savings_you_can=E2=80=99t_miss?=

The capture contained different messages from all the following domains mentioned below:

aggadi.com.br
aol.com
belissimacosmeticos.com.br
catcorlando.com
citrosuco.com.br
connect.match.com
uspoloassn.com
newsletter.coastalscents.com
email.modait.com.br
facebookmail.com
id.apple.com
itmae.com.br
limecrimemakeup.com
offers.dominos.com
pcpitstopmail.com
photojojo.com
pof.com
sigmabeauty.com
submamails.com
twitter.com
walmart.com

Credential Exchange

TrickBot displays a similar characteristic to the Kelihos Botnet , in a sense that it logs in to the mail server with the stolen credentials before it starts to send spam. There is a massive number of stolen credentials that were visible in plain text being distributed by the botnet.

Fig. 10: Stolen Credentials reconstructed in Network Miner


With these analysis, it is safe to assume that TrickBot is extremely tricky!! Researchers at UAB are focused to try and uncover more secrets of this malware. Will keep everyone posted with our new findings!!

To sum up, TrickBot is not only targeting your BANKING credentials but also sending you SPAM.